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Abstract
We estimate an open economy VAR model to quantify the e¤ect of monetary policy and
capital inows shocks on the US housing market. The shocks are identied with sign restrictions
derived from a standard DSGE model. We nd that monetary policy shocks have a limited
e¤ect on house prices and residential investment. In contrast, capital inows shocks driven by
an increase in foreign savings have a positive and persistent e¤ect on both housing variables.
Other sources of capital inows shocks, such as foreign monetary expansion or an increase in
aggregate demand in the US, have a more limited role.
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1 Introduction
One of the major sources of the nancial and economic problems of the last three years was the
collapse of the housing boom that had been developing in the United States since the mid-1990s.
This paper considers the relative importance of two potential causes of the boom:
1. Global imbalances. One view is that the housing boom was caused by the increase in
capital inows to the US that has been occurring since the mid-1990s. During that period, the US
current account decit widened while other countries, especially oil exporters and Asian economies,
have been building surpluses. The ow of capital from EMEs to the US generated an increase in
liquidity in the US nancial system and drove down long term real interest rates. Low interest
rates reduced the cost of borrowing and encouraged a credit boom and an increase in house prices.
Low risk-free rates led portfolio investors to allocate a larger part of their wealth to higher yielding
(and riskier) assets, including US sub-prime residential mortgage backed securities and leveraged
corporate loans. This hypothesis is advanced in King (2009) who suggests that "the origins of the
crisis lie in the imbalances in the world economy which built up over a decade or more".
2. Loose monetary policy in the US. This explanation also stresses the role of low interest
rates in generating the housing boom. However, it attributes the decrease in interest rates to
monetary policy loosening rather than an increase in foreign capital inows. According to this
explanation, a fear of deation led the Federal Reserve to keep short term interest rates too low
for too long. The reduction in the cost of borrowing encouraged a credit boom and an increase in
house prices. This is the view in Taylor (2009), who shows that, since the early 2000s, the Federal
Funds rate has been signicantly lower than the level implied by the Taylor rule.
Both explanations could have some merit. How much weight should we put on each one?
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the US current account balance and house prices. It is clear
that the build up in house prices since the mid-1990s happened at the same time as the widening
in the US current account decit. However, this does not imply causality and does not rule out the
possibility of both variables being driven by some third factor.
2
Figure 1. Current account balance and house prices Figure 2. US short term and long term
nominal interest rates
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A piece of suggestive evidence in support of the hypothesis that global imbalances played a
central role in the housing boom is the evolution of short and long-term nominal interest rates in
the US (Figure 2). As has been well documented, despite the rise in short-term interest rates from
2004 until the current crisis, long-term bond yields have remained low  the so-called long rate
conundrum(Greenspan (2005)). This can be seen as evidence in favour of the global imbalances
story: even though the Fed was increasing policy rates, long rates remained low over a period
in which the US current account decit kept rising. However, there are other factors which may
explain the low level of long rates, for example high corporate savings or an increase in monetary
policy credibility. And the increase in short rates from 2004 to 2007 does not immediately discard
the loose monetary policy story. This story is not simply about changes in short rates, but rather
about deviations from the appropriate level of rates as suggested, for example, by the Taylor rule.
Figure 3 shows that, even though the Fed has been increasing rates in the period from 2004 to
2007, rates were still kept at a level lower than what would be implied by the Taylor rule.
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Figure 3. Actual and counterfactual (Taylor rule) Federal funds rate
Source: Taylor (2009).
A simple look at the data does not allow us to assess which of the two explanations is correct.
At present there are not yet many studies trying to disentangle its causes and quantify the relative
contribution of di¤erent factors. In a recent speech, Bernanke (2010) discusses the link between
monetary policy and house prices in the run up to the crisis. Using cross-country evidence, he shows
that "countries in which current accounts worsened and capital inows rose had greater house price
appreciation" in the period from 2001Q4 to 2006Q3. He concludes that capital inows seem to be
a promising avenue for explaining cross-country di¤erences in real house price growth.
Capital inows into the US could be driven by di¤erent factors. For example, they could result
from an increase in savings abroad, which pushes down long-term world interest rates and leads
to an inow of capital into the US, a deterioration of the US current account and an appreciation
of the dollar  this is the savings gluthypothesis suggested in Bernanke (2005). Alternatively,
a monetary policy expansion abroad would reduce foreign interest rates and increase the relative
attractiveness of US assets, leading to capital inows into the US. These two hypotheses  savings
glutand monetary expansion abroad  point to external factors as explanations for the US current
account decit. An alterative view attributes the decit to domestic factors, in particular an
increase in domestic aggregate demand and a reduction in domestic savings. It is also possible that
the reduction in macroeconomic volatility experienced in the US since the mid-1980s  the so-
called "great moderation"  reduced precautionary savings in the US and increased the perceived
safety of US assets, attracting capital ows from abroad. We develop a framework to identify the
contribution of US monetary policy and of these di¤erent sources of capital inows to the housing
boom.
There is a relatively large literature on the e¤ect of monetary policy on house prices. Iacoviello
(2005) estimates a VAR on interest rates, ination, detrended output and house prices using US
data from 1974 to 2003. He identies monetary policy shocks through a Choleski decomposition and
nds that monetary policy shocks have a signicant e¤ect on house prices. Del Negro and Otrok
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(2007) estimate a VAR on the Federal Funds rate, the mortgage rate, total reserves of depository
institutions, GDP, the GDP deator, and the common factor of state-level house prices in the
US. They adopt a di¤erent identication strategy from Iacoviello and use sign restrictions on the
impulse responses to identify monetary policy shocks. The house price factor shows a signicant
and persistent drop following a contractionary monetary policy shock. However, in a counterfactual
exercise, Del Negro and Otrok simulate the evolution of the house price factor in the absence of
monetary policy shocks and nd a small di¤erence between the actual and the simulated series.
This suggests that the impact of monetary policy shocks on house prices is small in comparison with
the magnitude of recent uctuations. Jarocin´ski and Smets (2008) estimate a nine-variable VAR
for the US and identify monetary policy shocks using a combination of zero and sign restrictions.
They nd that a monetary policy shock which reduces the Federal Funds rate by 25 basis points
generates an immediate reduction in real house prices. The reduction reaches its peak of about
0:5% two and a half years after the shock.
There are also some studies looking at the e¤ect of capital ows on US interest rates. Warnock
and Warnock (2009) estimate that, if there had been no foreign o¢ cial ows into US government
bonds over the course of a year, long rates would be almost 100 basis points higher. Focusing on the
spread between the yields on long maturity corporate bonds and Treasury bonds, Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) nd that, if governmental holders (foreign central banks, US Federal
Reserve banks, state and local governments) were to sell their holdings of US Treasuries and exit
the market, the yield on US Treasuries would rise by the same amount as the yield on corporate
bonds. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) develop a model to show how capital ows to the US
triggered a sharp rise in asset prices and a decrease in risk premia and interest rates. All these
studies point to a link between low US long interest rates and the demand for US assets by foreign
savers.
The study that is closest to ours is Bracke and Fidora (2008) which explains the evolution of
the US current account balance and asset prices by three types of shocks: monetary policy shocks,
preference shocks (capturing changes in the savings rate), and investment shocks. The authors
estimate two separate structural VARs, for the US and emerging Asia. For the US they look
at a monetary policy expansion, a reduction in the savings rate and an increase in investment.
For emerging Asia they dene these shocks with the opposite signs (monetary policy contraction,
increase in the savings rate and reduction in investment). The shocks are identied by imposing
sign restrictions on the impulse responses. The ndings suggest that monetary shocks explain the
largest part of the variation in the US current account balance and asset prices.
Our paper develops an empirical framework to identify the relative contributions of US monetary
policy and capital inows to the housing boom. We estimate an open economy vector autoregres-
sive (VAR) model with US and foreign variables and identify the e¤ect of a US monetary policy
expansion and of various shocks that increase capital ows to the US. Unlike Bracke and Fidora, we
include both US and foreign variables in the VAR, allowing identication of home and foreign shocks
simultaneously. Identication is achieved by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses, as
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in Uhlig (2005). The identifying sign restrictions are derived from a standard two-country dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. To capture developments in the housing market, we
look at the e¤ect of di¤erent shocks on real residential investment and real house prices.
Consistent with the evidence in Bernanke (2010), our results suggest that shocks that reduce
aggregate demand in the rest of the world  i.e., the savings glut  have a signicant and
positive e¤ect on real residential investment and real house prices, while monetary policy shocks
have a smaller and less signicant e¤ect. One way of comparing the e¤ects of di¤erent types of
shocks is by computing the fraction of the variation in real residential investment and real house
prices explained by each type of shock. We nd that, at a forecast horizon of 20 quarters, negative
aggregate demand shocks in the rest of the world explain about 7:5% of the variation in real
residential investment and 10:7% of the variation in real house prices. By contrast, US monetary
policy shocks explain less than 3% of the variation in both housing variables. Other shocks which
generate capital inows to the US explain a larger fraction of the variation in the housing variables
than US monetary policy shocks, but are less important than savings glutshocks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a standard DSGE model from which we
derive the sign restrictions used to identify the structural VAR. Section 3 describes the economet-
ric framework. Section 4 discusses the baseline empirical results and presents robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Identication
This section presents a standard DSGE model from which the sign restrictions used in the empirical
exercise are derived. We follow closely the model in Ferrero, Gertler and Svensson (2007).
There are two countries: the US and the rest of the world (ROW). Each country has one
representative household that consumes tradable and nontradable goods. Tradable goods can be
produced at home or abroad. For simplicity, there are no capital goods.
In order to study current account dynamics, we assume imperfect international capital markets.
In particular, there is a single bond that is traded internationally and is denominated in units of
home currency. In addition, investors in ROW may hold a bond denominated in units of foreign
currency which is not traded internationally.
2.1 Model
2.1.1 Households
The household has a continuum of workers who consume and supply labor in the intermediate goods
sector. We assume that each worker works in a particular intermediate goods rm. Intermediate
goods rms are denoted by f 2 [0; 1], where f 2 [0; ) produce tradable goods and f 2 (; 1]
produce nontradable goods.
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The preferences of the household are given by:
Ut  Et
1X
s=0
t+s 1ut+s
where period utility ut is given by:
ut  logCt   [
Z 
0
LHt(f)
1+'
1 + '
df +
Z 1

LNt(f)
1+'
1 + '
df ]
Ct is a composite of tradable (CTt) and nontradable (CNt) consumption goods:
Ct  C

T tC
1 
Nt
(1  ) (1)
The Cobb-Douglas specication is employed to maintain analytical tractability. It implies an
elasticity of substitution of unity between tradables and nontradables. In the calibration we let
this elasticity (denoted by ) vary between 0:5 and 1:5.
Tradable consumption goods are a composite of home (CHt) and foreign (CFt) tradables:
CTt  [
1
C
 1

Ht + (1  )
1
C
 1

Ft ]

 1 (2)
LHt(f) denotes hours worked by worker f in the home tradable sector and LNt(f) denotes
hours worked by worker f in the nontradable sector.
To ensure a determinate steady state in the presence of incomplete international nancial mar-
kets, the discount factor t is endogenous and is determined by the recursion:
t = tt 1
with t  e
&t
1+'(logCt #) where Ct is detrended consumption and &t is a preference shock, which
follows a rst order stochastic process:
&t = &&t 1 + u&t; u&t~i:i:d:N(0; 
2
& )
A positive shock to &t increases the discount factor, making households more patient.
The households budget constraint is give by:
PtCt +Bt = It 1Bt 1 +
Z 
0
WHt(f)LHt(f)df +
Z 1

WNt(f)LNt(f)df +  t
where Bt is nominal holdings at the beginning of period t+ 1 of an internationally traded one-
period risk-free bond denominated in home currency, It is the gross nominal domestic currency
interest rate, Wt(f) is the nominal wage of worker f and  t are dividends net of lump sum taxes.
The price index Pt can be derived from the households expenditure minimization problem given the
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consumption composites (1) and (2). It is given by the following function of the price of tradables
PTt and the price of nontradables PNt :
Pt = P

T tP
1 
Nt
where the price of tradables PTt is a function of the price of home tradables (PHt) and the price
of foreign tradables expressed in home currency (PFt):
PTt  [P 1 Ht + (1  )P 1 F t ]
1
1 
The law of one price holds for tradables, i.e.:
PHt =
1
"t
P Ht
PFt =
1
"t
P Ft
where "t is the nominal exchange rate dened such that an increase represents an appreciation
of the home currency. Foreign currency prices are denoted with a star.
Households maximize utility subject to the budget constraint. This gives the standard Euler
equation for consumption-savings decisions:
EtftIt
Pt
Pt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
) 1g = 1
and the labour supplies for each sector:
WHt(f)
Pt
1
Ct
= LHt(f)
'
WNt(f)
Pt
1
Ct
= LNt(f)
'
The allocation of consumption between tradables and nontradables is given by:
CTt = (
PTt
Pt
) 1Ct
CNt = (1  )(PNt
Pt
) 1Ct
And the allocation between home and foreign tradables is given by:
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CHt = (
PHt
PTt
) 1CTt
CFt = (1  )(PFt
PTt
) 1CTt
2.1.2 Firms
Final Goods Sector Firms in the nal goods sector combine intermediate goods to produce
output using a CES production function:
YHt  [  1
Z 
0
YHt(f)
 1
 df ]

 1
YNt  [(1  )  1
Z 1

YNt(f)
 1
 df ]

 1
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is given by  > 1:
From cost minimization we get the demands for intermediate goods:
YHt(f) = 
 1[
PHt(f)
PHt
] YHt (3)
YNt(f) = 
 1[
PNt(f)
PNt
] YNt
The price indices are aggregations of the prices of intermediate goods:
PHt = [
 1
Z 
0
PHt(f)
1 df ]
1
1 
PNt = [(1  ) 1
Z 1

PNt(f)
1 df ]
1
1 
Intermediate Goods Sector Firms in the intermediate goods sector produce output using only
labor according to a linear production function:
YHt(f) = AtLHt(f) (4)
YNt(f) = AtLNt(f)
where At is labor productivity.
Firms act competitively to minimize costs and set the nominal marginal cost equal to the
nominal wage adjusted for productivity:
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MCHt(f) =
WHt(f)
At
MCNt(f) =
WNt(f)
At
To introduce a role for monetary policy, the model includes nominal price rigidities. In partic-
ular, each period a fraction  of intermediate goods rms do not adjust prices. The fraction 1  
that change prices set them to maximize the present discounted value of prots:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s[PHt(f) MCH;t+s(f)]YH;t+s(f) (5)
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s[PNt(f) MCN;t+s(f)]YN;t+s(f)
The stochastic discount factor between t and t+ s is given by t;t+s = t+s(
Ct+s
Ct
) 1( PtPt+s ).
Intermediate goods rms maximize (5) subject to the demand for their products (3) and the
production function (4). The rst order conditions for the optimal prices POHt and P
O
Nt are:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s[P
O
Ht(f) 

   1MCH;t+s(f)]YH;t+s(f) = 0
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s[P
O
Nt(f) 

   1MCN;t+s(f)]YN;t+s(f) = 0
The price index for each sector evolves according to:
PHt = [P
1 
Ht 1 + (1  )(POHt 1)1 ]
1
1 
PNt = [P
1 
Nt 1 + (1  )(PONt 1)1 ]
1
1 
2.1.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a simple interest rate rule with partial adjustment:
It = I

t 1[(
Pt
Pt 1
) ]1 e!t
In log linear form, this equation is the familiar Taylor rule:
it = it 1 + (1  )t + !t (6)
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where !t is a monetary policy shock which follows a rst order stochastic process:
!t = !!t 1 + u!t; u!t~i:i:d:N(0; 
2
!)
2.1.4 Current Account Dynamics and the Real Exchange Rate
Nominal bond holdings Bt evolve according to:
Bt
Pt
=
It 1Bt 1
Pt
+NXt
where NXt is the real value of net exports:
NXt  PHtYHt   PTtCTt
Pt
The current account is the net change in real bond holdings:
CAt  Bt  Bt 1
Pt
The real exchange rate is given by:
Qt  "tPt
P t
2.1.5 Uncovered Interest Parity Condition
The foreign country has a similar structure to the home country, but ROW investors can hold a
foreign bond in addition to the internationally traded bond. For them to be indi¤erent between
holding these two types of bonds, the uncovered interest parity condition must hold:
EtfIt "t+1
"t
P t
P t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
) 1g = EtfIt
P t
P t+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
) 1etg
t is a risk premium shock, which follows a rst order stochastic process:
t = t 1 + ut; ut~i:i:d:N(0; 
2
)
In log linear form, the uncovered interest parity condition gives the following relation between
real interest rates, real exchange rates and the risk premium shock:
(it   Ett+1) = (it   Ett+1)  (Etqt+1   qt) + t (7)
An increase in t raises the return required by foreign investors to invest in the internationally
traded bond.
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2.1.6 Market Clearing
For the nontradable sector, production must equal demand:
YNt = CNt
Y Nt = C

Nt
For the home tradable sector, production must equal the sum of the demands by home and
foreign consumers:
YHt = CHt + C

Ht
Because domestic bonds are in zero net supply, the sum of nominal holdings of the domestic
bond by home and foreign investors must equal zero:
Bt +B

t = 0
If these conditions are satised, WalrasLaw ensures clearing in the foreign tradable sector.
2.2 Robust Sign Restrictions
2.2.1 Shocks
We calibrate the model to study the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks. We are interested in distinguishing
between two types of shocks: monetary policy and capital inows. While monetary policy shocks
have been widely studied in the literature, the interpretation of capital inows shocks requires
further explanation.
Capital inows into the US could be driven by di¤erent factors. For example, they could result
from an increase in savings in ROW, which pushes down long-term world interest rates and leads
to an inow of capital into the US, a deterioration of the US current account and an appreciation of
the dollar  the savings gluthypothesis suggested in Bernanke (2005). Alternatively, a monetary
policy expansion in ROW would reduce foreign interest rates and increase the relative attractiveness
of US assets, leading to capital inows into the US. These two explanations  savings glutand
ROW monetary expansion  point to external factors as explanations for the US current account
decit. An alterative view attributes the decit to domestic factors, in particular an increase
in domestic aggregate demand and a reduction in domestic savings. Our analysis distinguishes
between these di¤erent sources of capital inows.
We are interested in identifying separately the e¤ect of US monetary policy shocks and of
di¤erent types of shocks that generate capital inows to the US. These shocks would be confounded
if an improvement in the US monetary policy framework increased the perceived safety of US
assets, encouraging foreign investors to invest more in the US. In that case, capital inows would
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be driven by monetary policy and it would not be possible to separate them. To address this issue,
we separately identify a risk premium shock, which captures changes in the perceived safety of US
assets as a result of a decline in macroeconomic risk due to the great moderation, for example.
By doing this, we are able to control for capital inows that are driven by improvements in the
monetary policy framework. The component of capital inows that is left is not driven by monetary
policy and we are able to do a horse racebetween monetary policy and capital inows shocks and
separate their contribution to the housing boom1.
To summarize, we calibrate the theoretical model and derive impulse responses to ve types of
shocks:
1. Expansionary monetary policy shock in the US. This is a negative shock to !t in equation (6).
2. Reduction in aggregate demand in ROW. This is the savings glutshock and can be seen as a
positive shock to &t in ROW, which increases the discount factor and makes ROW households
more patient.
3. Expansionary monetary policy shock in ROW. This is a negative shock to !t in ROW.
4. Increase in aggregate demand in the US. This can be seen as a negative shock to &t in the
US, which reduces the discount factor and makes US households more impatient.
5. Risk premium shock. This is a shock that increases the perceived safety of US assets. It can
be seen as a reduction in t in equation (7), i.e., a reduction in the real interest rate that
investors require in order to invest in the US.
2.2.2 Parameter Ranges
To derive robust implications from the theoretical model for each of these shocks that are not
sensitive to variations in the structural parameters, we follow the approach in Peersman and Straub
(2009) and Pappa (2009) and dene a range for each of the structural parameters based on the
empirical literature. The intervals for all parameter values are reported in Table 1. Most intervals
are uncontroversial and contain the values used in the calibration in Ferrero, Gertler and Svensson
(2007). We assume shocks to aggregate demand and the risk premium shock to be quite persistent,
as they represent structural preference parameters and are likely to persist over time. We assume
a smaller degree of persistence for monetary policy shocks. The model is calibrated to match
quarterly dynamics.
1Fogli and Perri (2008) document a positive correlation between changes in output volatility and changes in the
net foreign asset position in OECD countries. They construct a model where a reduction in business cycle volatility
leads to a reduction in precautionary savings and a permanent deterioration in the net foreign asset position. Our
risk premium shock captures this mechanism.
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Table 1. Parameter values and ranges
Parameter Description Range
 Preference share for tradables 0:1  0:3
 Preference share for home tradables 0:6  0:9
 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables 1:5  3
 Elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables 0:5  1:5
' Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1:5  2:5
 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs 6  11
 Probability that price does not adjust 0:5  0:75
&;H Persistence of preference shock at home 0:95  0:99
&;F Persistence of preference shock in ROW 0:95  0:99
 Persistence of risk premium shock 0:95  0:99
!;H Persistence of monetary shock at home 0:4  0:7
!;F Persistence of monetary shock in ROW 0:4  0:7
 Smoothing coe¢ cient in Taylor rule 0:5  0:9
;H Response to CPI in Taylor rule at home 1:5  3
;F Response to CPI in Taylor rule in ROW 1:5  3
2.2.3 Dynamics
Having dened a sensible range of parameter values, we use the model to produce impulse responses
for each shock. We assume that the parameters are uniformly distributed over the selected para-
meter range. We then draw a random value for each parameter from that range and calculate the
impulse response functions. We report the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse
responses.
Figure 4 (a) reports theoretical impulse responses for a US monetary policy expansion in which
the US nominal short term interest rate decreases by about one percentage point2. The ndings
are in line with well-known results in the literature. In particular, we nd that a reduction in
nominal short term interest rates in the US increases consumption and prices. This is consistent
with the ndings in Canova and de Nicoló (2002) who show that, under a variety of di¤erent models,
output and prices rise following an expansionary monetary policy shock. We choose to focus on
consumption and not output in order to separate the e¤ect on domestic absorption and on net
exports (which is captured by the current account). The reduction in US interest rates increases
the attractiveness of investment in ROW, leading to outows of capital from the US. As a result,
the US current account improves and the dollar depreciates. The inows of capital into ROW
generate an increase in foreign consumption.
2The size of the shocks is calibrated as follows. For shocks that generate a US current account decit, we calibrate
them to generate a decit of about 15% of tradable output. This is equivalent to a decit of about 4% of GDP,
which matches the current situation. For shocks that do not generate a current account decit (for example, a US
monetary expansion), we calibrate them to generate an increase in US consumption of about 2%, which equals the
increase originated by a savings glutshock.
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There is a signicant amount of empirical work testing the e¤ects of monetary shocks on the
exchange rate and the current account. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) nd that a contractionary
monetary policy shock in the US leads to a persistent and signicant appreciation of the dollar.
Zettelmeyer (2004) conrms this for Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Betts and Devereux
(2001) estimate VARs on US and G7 variables and identify monetary shocks using a Choleski
decomposition. They nd that expansionary monetary shocks generate an exchange rate deprecia-
tion. Lane (2001) focuses on the e¤ect on the current account using long run restrictions. He nds
that the current account initially deteriorates following a monetary expansion, but quickly starts to
improve and moves into surplus after about a year. Prasad (1999) estimates a structural VAR for
G7 countries and also identies monetary policy shocks using long run restrictions. He nds that
a monetary expansion leads to an exchange rate depreciation and an improvement in the current
account. Lee and Chinn (2006) conrm this nding in a VAR for 67 countries. Bems et al (2007)
estimate a VAR for the US and identify monetary shocks using a Choleski decomposition. They
conrm that a monetary expansion leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate, but nd that it
also causes a deterioration in the current account. Barnett and Straub (2008) arrive at a similar
conclusion using a VAR with sign restrictions. While these studies point to an unambiguous e¤ect
of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate, the e¤ect on the current account is uncertain. For
this reason, we do not impose any sign restrictions on the response of the current account and rely
on other variables for identication.
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Theoretical impulse responses
Figure 4 (a) US monetary policy expansion
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Turning now to di¤erent types of capital inows shocks, Figure 4 (b) reports theoretical impulse
responses following a negative shock to aggregate demand in ROW  savings glutshock. The
increase in the degree of patience of foreign households leads to a reduction in consumption and
an increase in savings in ROW. The extra savings are partly allocated to US assets, generating
an increase in consumption in the US, a current account decit and an appreciation of the dollar.
Long term interest rates decrease both in the US and in ROW in response to the increase in global
savings.
These results are consistent with the predictions of the model developed in Caballero et al
(2008). Their model contains two regions: the US and the rest of the world. These two regions are
initially symmetric and have the same degree of nancial development, i.e. the same capacity to
generate nancial assets from real investments. The model can be used to analyze the implications
of two phenomena: a reduction in the degree of nancial development in the rest of the world
following, for example, a collapse in its asset markets; and a gradual integration and emergence
of fast growing economies in the rest of the world. Both phenomena have the same implications,
generating a current account decit in the US and a decline in long term interest rates. The dollar
appreciates in the short run and depreciates gradually until it stabilizes in the long run.
Similar qualitative predictions are obtained in Sá and Viani (2010), who use a general equilib-
rium model to simulate the implications of a reduction in the preference of foreign investors for
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US assets, i.e. a reduction in capital inows. Their model shows that, if foreign investors invest a
smaller share of their wealth in dollar assets, the dollar would depreciate in the short run and the
current account would improve. The price of US assets would fall and the return would increase.
These predictions are identical to the ones we obtain but with opposite signs, since we study the
e¤ect of an increase rather than a reduction in capital inows to the US.
Figure 4 (b). Reduction in aggregate demand in ROW
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Another external factor which could explain an increase in capital inows to the US would be
a monetary policy expansion in ROW. The theoretical impulse responses for this shock, reported
in Figure 4 (c), are the mirror image of the ones reported in Figure 4 (a) for a US monetary
expansion. The shock increases consumption and prices in ROW. The reduction in interest rates
in ROW increases the attractiveness of investment in US assets, leading to capital inows to the
US and an appreciation of the dollar. The inow of capital fuels an increase in consumption in the
US.
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Figure 4 (c). ROW monetary policy expansion
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Figure 4 (d) reports theoretical impulse responses for a positive shock to aggregate demand in
the US, which provides a domestically-driven explanation for the current account decit. The shock
makes US households less patient, which reduces savings and increases consumption. US investors
who had part of their savings invested in ROW assets will sell some of those assets in order to
increase consumption. This increases the US current account decit and generates an appreciation
of the dollar. The outow of capital from ROW leads to a reduction in foreign consumption.
Interest rates in the US and ROW increase in response to the reduction in US savings.
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Figure 4 (d). Increase in aggregate demand in the US
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We now turn to the risk premium shock. As discussed above, this shock is introduced to ensure
that we can separate monetary policy and capital ows shocks. It may be the case that capital
inows to the US are driven by an improvement in its monetary policy framework, which generates
an environment of low and stable ination and reduces the risk premium required by foreigners
to invest in the US. This is empirically plausible since the US did experience a period of low and
stable ination  the great moderation before the global nancial crisis.
Figure 4 (e) reports theoretical impulse responses following a shock that reduces the risk pre-
mium required by foreigners to invest in US assets. The increase in the perceived safety of US assets
encourages foreign investors to reallocate part of their savings from domestic assets into US assets.
This redistributes resources away from ROW into the US, leading to a reduction in consumption in
ROW and an increase in consumption in the US. The increase in capital inows in the US generates
a current account decit and an appreciation of the dollar. Interest rates decrease in the US and
increase in ROW reecting the increase in demand for US assets and the reduction in demand for
ROW assets.
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Figure 4 (e). Risk premium shock
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Table 2 summarizes the sign restrictions that will be used in the empirical model to identify the
shocks. The predictions of the model are su¢ cient to distinguish between all ve shocks that we
are considering, since there is at least one common and one di¤erent sign restriction for each pair
of shocks. We allow for a possible zero impact of the shocks since the restrictions are imposed as
 or . The restrictions are imposed on impact and for two quarters after the shock.
Table 2. Sign restrictions
Variab les/sho ck US monetary expansion Reduction in ROW AD ROW monetary expansion Increase in US AD Risk prem ium
US consump  0  0  0  0  0
ROW consump  0  0  0  0  0
US short rate  0
ROW short rate  0
US long rate  0  0  0  0
ROW long rate  0  0  0  0
US CPI  0
ROW CPI  0
Current account  0  0  0
Exchange rate  0  0  0  0  0
Note that the restriction on the long term nominal interest rate for monetary policy shocks does
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not necessarily follow from theory. We impose this restriction in order to avoid giving an advantage
to savings glutshocks in the horse raceto explain the housing boom. Because long term interest
rates fall with a savings glut shock and these are the rates that determine the cost of housing
loans, if we did not impose this restriction for monetary policy shocks we would be increasing
the chances of savings glutshocks explaining most of the variation in the housing variables. We
therefore impose this restriction for monetary policy shocks as well and retain only those shocks
that do not lead to an increase in long term nominal interest rates.
3 Econometric Framework
3.1 Reduced Form Model and Data
We estimate the following open economy vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
Yt = c+
LX
k=1
AiYt k + ut t = 1; :::T ut~N(0;) (8)
where c is a constant term, L is the lag length, Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, Ai is a
matrix of coe¢ cients and ut is the error term. The vector Yt contains twelve endogenous variables.
Ten of these variables are used to identify the shocks: short term and long term nominal interest
rates in the US and ROW, real household consumption expenditure and the CPI in the US and
ROW (in logs), the ratio of the US current account balance to GDP, and the dollar nominal trade-
weighted exchange rate (in logs). The other two variables are used to capture developments in the
housing market: real residential investment (in logs), and an index of real house prices (in logs)
deated by the GDP deator. The model is estimated with two lags on quarterly data from 1979
Q1 to 2006 Q4.
Table 3 lists the variables and data sources. Data on interest rates and the CPI are from the
dataset constructed in Pesaran, Schuermann and Smith  PSS (2008)3. Data on real household
consumption expenditure is constructed using the share of (nominal) household consumption ex-
penditure to GDP from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) multiplied by the level of
real GDP from PSS (2008). ROW variables are constructed as a trade-weighted average of the 32
countries (excluding the US) in the PSS (2008) dataset4. Private residential investment is obtained
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) and house prices are measured by the national
house price index constructed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA, previously called
3These data can be downloaded from
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/pesaran/fp09/Data_and_Codes_For_PSS_Rejoinder.zip.
4We have also estimated the model using GDP weights to construct the ROW variables and the results are
qualitatively robust. We use three sets of weights: an average over the period 1980Q1 to 1982Q4 to be used at the
start of the sample (from 1979Q1 to 1986Q4); an average over the period 1991Q1 to 1993Q4 to be used at the middle
of the sample (from 1987Q1 to 1997Q4); and an average over the period 2002Q1 to 2004Q4 to be used at the end
of the sample (from 1998Q1 to 2006Q4). This combines the simplicity of xed weights with the up-to-date nature
of time-varying weights. As discussed in Dees et al (2007), trade weights that vary continuously could mask the
underling movements of the macroeconomic variables that go into the construction of the ROW variables.
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OFHEO). Both variables are deated by the GDP deator. The FHFA house price index is a
repeated-sales index, measuring average price changes in repeated sales or renancings on the same
properties. The use of repeated transactions helps to control for di¤erences in the quality of the
properties included in the sample. For this reason, the index is described as a constant quality
house price index. It includes single-family properties whose mortgages have been purchased or
securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since January 1975. The evolution of this index is plotted
in Figure 1, which shows that house prices have substantially increased since the late 1990s.
Table 3. Variables and data sources
Variable Source
Short term interest rate (3 month) US PSS (2008)
Short term interest rate (3 month) ROW PSS (2008)
Long term interest rate (10 year) US PSS (2008)
Long term interest rate (10 year) ROW PSS (2008)
Real household consumption expenditure US PSS (2008) and IMF IFS
Real household consumption expenditure ROW PSS (2008) and IMF IFS
CPI US PSS (2008)
CPI ROW PSS (2008)
Ratio of US current account balance to nominal GDP OECD Economic Outlook
Dollar nominal e¤ective exchange rate IMF IFS
Real residential investment FRED, code PRFI, deated by GDP deator
Real house price index FHFA index deated by GDP deator
Open economy VAR models typically have a large number of coe¢ cients to be estimated.
Previous work deals with the large dimension of the model by specifying it in di¤erences between
home and foreign variables  for example, Farrant and Peersman (2006) and Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2009). This implicitly assumes symmetry across regions and creates a problem with the
interpretation of the shocks. For example, if we observe a shock which reduces relative short term
interest rates, increases relative consumption and prices and leads to a relative depreciation, we
would not be able to distinguish whether this is an expansionary monetary policy shock at home or
a contractionary monetary policy shock abroad. Another way of dealing with the large dimension
of the model is to identify the shocks individually, without requiring them to all be present in the
data and be orthogonal to each other, as in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2009). This approach is
problematic because the impulse responses for one of the shocks could be capturing the e¤ect of
some other shock.
To get around these issues, we use an explicit Bayesian prior to deal with the dimensionality
problem. In particular, we use the prior suggested in Litterman (1986), often referred to as the
Minnesota prior. Banbura, Gianonne and Reichlin (2007) provide an intuitive explanation for this
type of prior and show that its application to large Bayesian VARs results in good forecasting
performance.
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The basic principle behind the Minnesota prior is that the variables in the VAR are centered
around a random walk with a drift so that the prior mean can be associated with the following
representation for Yt :
Yt = c+ Yt 1 + ut
This corresponds to shrinking the diagonal elements of A1 in model (8) towards one and shrink-
ing the o¤-diagonal coe¢ cients as well as the coe¢ cients in A2; :::; AL towards zero5. This prior is
appropriate for variables that show a high degree of persistence, but is not appropriate for variables
believed to be characterized by substantial mean reversion. Therefore, for short and long term in-
terest rates and the exchange rate we impose the prior of white noise by setting the prior mean
equal to zero.
3.2 Identication of the Shocks
To identify the shocks in the data, we use the sign restrictions derived from the theoretical model
and reported in Table 2. We are interested in identifying two types of shocks: an expansionary
monetary policy shock and an increase in capital ows to the US.
The common identication problem in VAR models is that some restrictions need to be imposed
on the covariance matrix in order to identify the structural shocks. Model (8) is the reduced form
version of the structural model, where innovations are given by the vector v, with E(vv0) = I.
What is needed is to nd a matrix B such that ut = Bvt, where the jth column of B represents
the immediate impact on all variables of the jth structural shock, one standard error in size. The
only restriction on B comes from the variance-covariance matrices of the reduced and structural
form shocks:
 = E(utu
0
t) = E(Bvtv
0
tB
0) = BB0 (9)
This leaves many degrees of freedom in specifying B and hence further restrictions are necessary
to achieve identication. The usual methodology is to impose a certain ordering on the sequencing
of shocks  Choleski decomposition. This corresponds to imposing zero restrictions on the con-
temporaneous interactions between variables, for example assuming that output does not respond
contemporaneously to changes in interest rates. But theory does not always provide guidance on
what the ordering should be.
Many studies have appealed to the reasonableness of the impulse responses as an informal
identication criterion and choose an ordering which delivers results consistent with conventional
wisdom. However, it is preferable to be explicit about the identifying restrictions. This can be
achieved with the method developed by Canova and de Nicoló (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003) and
5To set the shrinkage parameter, we follow the approach in Banbura, Gianonne and Reichlin (2008) and choose it
such that the in-sample t of the model is the same found with a smallerVAR. We estimate two smaller VARs: one
with short term and long term interest rates and another with the short term interest rate and the ratio of the US
current account balance to GDP. Both give a shrinkage parameter of about 0:09. We have also estimated the model
with a looser prior, using a shrinkage parameter of 0:12, and the results are qualitatively robust.
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Uhlig (2005) of imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses. The idea is to rely on economic
theory to derive reasonablesigns for the impulse responses. We use the sign restrictions derived
from the theoretical model in Section 2. We choose di¤erent matrices B which satisfy condition
(9) and, for each choice of B, generate the implied impulse response functions. Finally, we check
whether the sign restrictions are satised and keep the impulse responses which satisfy the sign
restrictions6.
To strike a balance between relying on theory to select impulse responses that look reasonable
and allowing the data to speak for itself, we impose a parsimonious set of sign restrictions. In
particular, we do not impose any restrictions on the responses of real residential investment and
real house prices, which are the variables we chose to capture developments in the housing market.
Instead, we leave them unrestricted and rely on the other variables for identication.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Baseline Results
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses over ve years obtained from estimating model (8) using the
sign restrictions in Table 2. The solid vertical lines indicate the responses for which sign restrictions
were imposed. We plot the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution
of impulse responses. If the distribution was normal, these percentiles would correspond to a one
standard deviation band.
6We have repeated the algortithm until we keep 100 impulse responses for each of the shocks. The results with
an acceptance threshold of 1000 are very similar.
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Figure 5. Empirical impulse responses
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ROW monetary policy expansion
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Increase in aggregate demand in the US
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Risk premium shock
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US monetary policy shocks do not seem to have a signicant e¤ect on real residential investment
or real house prices, with zero lying within the posterior coverage intervals7. By contrast, savings
glutshocks lead to a signicant increase in real residential investment and real house prices. The
increase in real residential investment peaks at about 1:5% six quarters after the shock and is quite
persistent. The increase in real house prices is also very persistent and is equal to about 0:52% ve
years after the shock. A monetary expansion in ROW also seems to have a positive e¤ect on real
residential investment and real house prices. Positive shocks to aggregate demand in the US should
not have a large e¤ect on housing variables since they lead to an increase in long term interest rates,
pushing up the cost of borrowing. Indeed our results show that these shocks have no signicant
e¤ect on real residential investment and have a positive but largely insignicant e¤ect on real house
prices. Finally, shocks which reduce the risk premium required by foreigners to invest in US assets
also have a positive but largely insignicant e¤ect on real residential investment and house prices.
These results suggest that US monetary policy played a limited role in the housing boom that
occurred in the run up to the global nancial crisis. The housing boom is better explained by
looking at shocks that generated an increase in capital inows to the US. Among these shocks, an
7This result appears inconsistent with previous studies which found a signicant e¤ect of monetary policy on house
prices  for example, Iacoviello (2005) and Jarocin´ski and Smets (2008). However, it should be noted that most of
these studies rely on zero restrictions for identication of monetary policy shocks, whereas our identication relies
only on sign restrictions. Using a framework more comparable to ours, Del Negro and Otrok (2007) nd a signicant
but small e¤ect of monetary policy shocks on residential investment and house prices using a VAR in rst di¤erences.
Their model estimated in levels delivers even smaller e¤ects.
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increase in savings in ROW  savings glut played a particularly important role. An increase in
real house prices of 0:52% may seem small, given that house prices doubled in the period from 1990
to 2007. However, we should note that, because the coe¢ cients in the model are time invariant, the
impulse responses show the e¤ect of the shocks on average over the whole sample period. It could be
that savings glutshocks have become more important from the mid-1990s as a result of nancial
globalization. Also, we are simulating the responses to a one-time shock. With repeated shocks
over time, the cumulative response would be larger. In our view, the message to be taken from
these impulse responses is that savings glutshocks provide a better explanation to the housing
boom than US monetary policy and other shocks that lead to capital inows to the US.
One way of comparing the relative contributions of di¤erent types of shocks is through vari-
ance decompositions. We ask what fraction of the variance of the k-step ahead forecast revision
Et(Yt+k)  Et 1(Yt+k) in, for example, real house prices, is accounted for by monetary policy and
capital ows shocks.
Table 4 reports the variance decompositions at di¤erent forecast horizons. Shocks which reduce
aggregate demand in ROW  savings glutshocks  explain a larger fraction of the variation in
real residential investment and real house prices than other types of shocks at all forecast horizons.
For example, at a forecast horizon of 20 quarters, negative aggregate demand shocks in ROW
explain about 7:5% of the variation in real residential investment and 10:7% of the variation in real
house prices. We interpret 10:7% as a sizable fraction, given that house prices should be a¤ected
by other shocks that we are not identifying, such as mortgage market innovations.
The variance decompositions conrm the limited role of US monetary policy shocks in explaining
the housing boom  these shocks explain less than 3% of the variation in real residential investment
and house prices. Other shocks which generate capital inows to the US explain a larger fraction
of the variation in the housing variables than US monetary policy shocks, but are less important
than savings glutshocks8.
Table 4. Variance decompositions
Real residential investment Real house prices
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years
Monetary expansion US 2.4% 2.3% 2.6% 4% 3.4% 2.5%
Negative AD shock ROW 8.6% 8.9% 7.5% 5.1% 9.7% 10.7%
Monetary expansion ROW 4.9% 6% 6.3% 4.8% 8.6% 10.1%
Positive AD shock US 4% 3.4% 3.8% 4.3% 4.2% 4.5%
Risk premium 6.5% 5.4% 4.6% 3.1% 4.5% 4%
8All shocks have quite persistent e¤ects. This is consistent with the ndings in Uhlig (2005), where monetary
shocks explain a signicant fraction of the variation in the variables in the model even ve years after the shock.
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4.2 Robustness
As discussed in Section 3, sign restrictions allow identication of the structural shocks v from the
reduced form errors ut = Bvt. Because the structural shocks satisfy the condition E(vv0) = I, the
matrix B needs to satisfy the restriction:
 = E(utu
0
t) = E(Bvtv
0
tB
0) = BB0
This leaves many degrees of freedom in specifying B. The sign restrictions methodology consists
of choosing di¤erent matrices B which satisfy this condition. For each choice of B, the implied im-
pulse response functions are generated and the impulse responses which satisfy the sign restrictions
are kept.
One problem with this approach, as noted in Fry and Pagan (2010), is that each choice of B
produces a new model, constituting a new set of structural equations and shocks. Consequently,
the sign restrictions approach does not identify a unique model. To summarize the information
from multiple models, we present the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse
responses. We order the impulse responses in ascending order for each variable and each shock and
compute these percentiles. The problem is that the sign restrictions procedure averages impulse
responses over several models. The model that produces the median impulse responses for, say,
house prices in the savings glutshock my not be the same as the model that produces the median
impulse responses for house prices in the US monetary policy shock. This comment also applies to
other percentiles.
Fry and Pagan (2005) suggest an approach for dealing with this problem. It consists of selecting
a single model whose impulse responses are as close to the median responses as possible. This is
called the Median Target (MT) method. Figure 6 shows the median and the MT impulse responses
for the housing variables. There is not much di¤erence between the median and the MT impulse
responses, except for the e¤ect of ROW monetary policy shocks and US aggregate demand shocks
on residential investment. Other studies that compare median and MT impulse responses, for
example Fry and Pagan (2010) and Canova and Paustian (2010), also do not nd large di¤erences
between them. It is reassuring that our results remain valid when we impose the restriction that
the impulse responses come from the same model.
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Figure 6. Empirical impulse responses: median, MT and 16th and 84th percentiles
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ROW monetary policy expansion
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Risk premium shock
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5 Conclusions
Prior to the crisis, academics and commentators worried about the sustainability of the US current
account decit and discussed the magnitude of the dollar depreciation that would be required to
balance the current account. Here we look at imbalances from a di¤erent perspective, focusing on
their role in driving down long-term real interest rates and encouraging a house price boom.
Our results suggest that savings glutshocks played a bigger role in driving up house prices
than the Federal Reserves loose monetary policy. While monetary policy shocks had no signicant
e¤ect on US real residential investment and real house prices, savings glutshocks had a positive
and persistent e¤ect on both housing variables. Results from variance decompositions suggest
that, at a forecast horizon of 20 quarters, savings glut shocks explain 7:5% of the variation in
real residential investment and 10:7% of the variation in real house prices. By contrast, monetary
policy shocks explain less than 3% of the variation in both housing variables. Other shocks which
generate capital inows to the US explain a larger fraction of the variation in the housing variables
than US monetary policy shocks, but are less important than savings glutshocks. These results
highlight the importance of developing policies to prevent the build up of large current account
imbalances.
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